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Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus
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greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its
misuse.1
I. INTRODUCTION

It has been remarked that "[i]f 1994 was the Year of the Internet, 1995
promises to be the Year of Legal Questions About the Internet."2 Now that 1995
has come and gone, there are still many issues to be resolved about the
Internet's unique status as a media technology and its legal status under current
law.3 The Internet provides new opportunities for expression and
communication unlike any media previously encountered. Not only is the
quantity and quality of information available electronically, both fact and
opinion, staggering, 4 but the Internet has opened up new paths of
communication, between all kinds of people. The ease with which people can
communicate electronically has allowed new groups to form and new issues
to enter the public consciousness. 5
With speech, however, comes friction. As Justice Douglas once said, "[t]he
First Amendment was designed 'to invite dispute,' to induce 'a condition of
unrest,' to 'create dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,' and even to stir
'people to anger." 6 The increased opportunities for speech created by the
Internet also increase the opportunities for disagreement and conflict. One
tactic some Internet speakers have used to avoid, and sometimes create, conflict
has been to speak anonymously. The ensuing debate over the propriety, neces-

1McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995).
2

Mark Eckenwiler, Criminal Law and the Internet, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1995, at S32.

3

The "Internet" refers to the global meta-network which enables data transmission

between heterogeneous computers on a global scale. One commentator, Lewis S.
Branscomb, has described the Internet "not as a network, but as a remarkably powerful
array of internetworking capabilities .... ." Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity,

Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE
L.J. 1639, 1639, n.5.
4
See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 at 1833-43
(1995); But see Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The FundamentalRole of Privacy
and Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105 (1995) (noting that although
information has increased in quantity, confidence in its quality has decreased).
5
For instance, the Usenet, a network which distributes text messages organized by
topic, is received at approximately one million sites worldwide, with an estimated four
million readers. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace,TIME, Dec. 6, 1993,
at 62. Only through such a massive and distributed system could people who have
heretofore been disconnected members of a niche in society gather and discuss
uncommon topics.
6

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) [hereinafter Miller] (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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pervasive. 7
sity, and legality of anonymous speech has been protracted and
8
Indeed, this debate has extended to all corners of the Networld.
The main source material for this Note is the recent case of McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n,9 in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated an
Ohio law requiring distributors of political leaflets to print their name and
address thereon. In McIntyre, the Court confirmed its continuing commitment
to preservation of the right to free speech, and interpreted the First Amendment
to protect much anonymous speech. 10 This Note will quantify how the Court's
stance in McIntyre will affect future issues of anonymity as they apply to the
Networld, which are likely to arise, given the highly controversial nature of the
Networld itself, the ease with which anonymity is obtained there, and the
Networld's current position as a center of public debate.
United States law, while not always decisive, 11 is often applied to issues
arising in the Networld and its cyberspaces, 12 if only because more 1access
4
providers 13 are based in the U.S. than in any other geographical nation.

7

See George P. Long, III, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1177 at 1179 (1994).
81 take the "Networld" metaphor for the on-line universe from Linda M. Harasim,
Networlds: Networks as Social Space, in GLOBAL NETWORKS: COMPUTERS AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 15 (L. M. Harasim, ed. 1993).
9115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
10

See infra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.

11

0ne commentator has remarked that "[iun cyberspace, the First Amendment is
nothing more than a local ordinance." John Perry Barlow, co-founder of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, conversation with author, Jan. 1995.
12 "Cyberspace" generally refers to the metaphysical group hallucination achieved
through computer-mediated interaction with the global network through virtual reality.
The term's inventor, William Gibson, first described cyberspace as:
A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation... A graphic representation of
data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human
system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights,
receding ....
WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).

Since the term's origination, it has been adopted to refer to the meta-universe
accessible through computer-mediated communication, whether through virtualreality immersion, or through more common and accessible text and graphic interfaces.
At least one modern commentator has focused the word's meaning still further to
refer to individual, discrete virtual locations, such as chat rooms or newsgroups. See
Branscomb, supra note 3, at 1640. See also David R. Johnson, Voluntary Voyagers, THE
RECORDER, May 8, 1995, at S16.
13

An "access provider," sometimes called a "service provider," is an entity which
provides access to the Networld (or various regions of it) to individuals or corporations.
Such access is usually provided for a fee, or as an adjunct "perk" for educational users,
although some organizations, such as public libraries, offer access as a public service.
PAUL GILSTER, THE INTERNET NAVIGATOR 564 (1994).
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This Note will first summarize the pre-Mclntyre status of anonymity law; it
will then discuss McIntyre itself, and interpret its constitutional effects. It will
then address the Networld ramifications of McIntyre, showing how the Court's
decision will affect various Networld phenomena in three settings:
requirement of identification to use government-provided services;
requirement of identification to gain access to the Networld through a private
access provider; and requirements of identification in specific cases.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PRE-McINTYRE LAW ON ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Anonymous speech has been used for many different reasons in many
different eras. In Colonial times, anonymous speech was commonly used to
criticize the British government, 15 since the British were known for their harsh
16
treatment of political enemies.
Pseudonymous and anonymous speech was also used during the ratification
debates on the Constitution. 17 The Federalist Papers, a series of treatises
authored by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison on the proper
shape of self-government in the new United States, was written
pseudonymously, as were many Anti-Federalist replies. 18 Anonymous and
pseudonymous speech was also used after Ratification to comment, sometimes
scathingly, on the new government. 19 Anonymous political speech was
commonly used in America well into the 19th century.20

14 See MIDS, State of the Internet, July 1996, 304 MATRIX MAPS QUARTERLY 3 (visited
January 27,1997) <http://www3.mids.org//mmq/304/index.html>.
15 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 at 64 (1960) [hereinafter Talley]; B. BAILYN & J.
HENCH, THE PRESS & THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1980).
16

The Court cited the following example in Talley, supra note 15:
John Lilbume was whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing to
answer questions designed to get evidence to convict him or
someone else for the secret distribution of books in England.
Two Puritan ministers, John Penry and John Udal, were
sentenced to death on charges that they were responsible for
writing, printing or publishing books.
Id. at 65 (1960) (citing1 Hallam, The ConstitutionalHistory of England (1855), 205-06,232).
17 It is beyond the scope of this Note to consider the legal ramifications of
pseudonymous speech in the Networld. To some extent, of course, almost all speech in
the Networld is pseudonymous, due to the current custom of substituting "usernames"
for true names. See, GILSTER, supranote 13, at 32-33. Regardless of this custom, however,
it is fairly easy (at least from the perspective of law enforcement agencies and
experienced computer users) to ascertain the real-world identity of a Networld citizen
given their username, while various methods of "laundering" Internet communications
can serve as an impenetrable shield of identity.
18Mclntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517, n.6.
19

See Id. at 1529-30. The Court stated that:
[Alnonymous pamphlets and newspaper articles remained the
favorite medium for expressing views on candidates.... It seems
that actual names were used rarely, and usually only by the can-
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was willing to infringe on the freedom of speakers to remain anonymous only
if necessary to qualify for some granted privilege or entitlement. Newspaper
publishers which wished to remain anonymous could still use the mails, but
could not qualify for less expensive second-class postage rates.
Twenty-five years later, the Court decided its first handbill ban case, Lovell
v. Griffin.2 6 This 1938 case struck down an ordinance in the city of Griffin,
Georgia which required anyone wishing to distribute literature of any kind
(including newspapers, handbills, or advertisements) to first obtain a permit
27
from the City Manager.
In unanimously overturning the ordinance, the Court noted that "[tihe
struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed at the power of the
licensor."28 Since "the ordinance in question would restore the system of licence
and censorship in its baldest form," the Court held it to violate the First
Amendment. 29 The Court examined the Framers' original intent in extending
protection to the press, and found that the legislative authors of the First
Amendment intended to prevent practices exactly like the ones at issue in
30
Lovell.
The Court also noted that "[t]he liberty of the press is not confined to
newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and
leaflets .... The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of

publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." 31 This showed
a commitment by the Court to apply press freedoms to diverse media, not just
printed text.

Id. at 316.
26303 U.S. 444 (1938) [hereinafter Lovell].
27

The ordinance read:
Section 1. That the practice of distributing, either by hand or
otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of
any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or
whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of
Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the
City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be
deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against
the City of Griffin.
Section 2. The Chief of Police of the City of Griffin and the
police force of the City of Griffin are hereby required and
directed to suppress the same and to abate any nuisance as
is described in the first section of this ordinance.
Id. at 447-48.
28

1d. at 451.

29

1d. at 452.

30

1d. at 451-52. The Court stated that "the prevention of [prior restraint on
publication] was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision." 303
U.S. 451-52 (1938).
31

1d. at 452.
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The following term, the Court reaffirmed its Lovell decision in Schneider v.
State (Town of Irvington).32 This case was brought by four cities who had passed
ordinances similar to Griffin's, with the defendant cities arguing that the
33
ordinances were the only way to prevent littering. The Court struck down
the statutes on the grounds that no proof existed that banning leafleting would
actually deter littering, and that littering was best controlled by statutes directly
34
The statutes, therefore, were fatally overbroad, unreasonably
regulating it.
35
right to free speech.
the
on
impinging
36
The next major case dealing with anonymity was United States v. Harriss, a
1954 decision in which the Court upheld a statute which forced lobbyists to
register if they solicited or received contributions for the purpose of influencing
legislation. The Court acknowledged that the statute "may as a practical matter
37
act as a deterrent to the exercise of [lobbyists'] First Amendment rights,' but
upheld it anyway, holding that "[tihe hazard of such restraint is too remote to
require striking down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within
the area of congressional power and is designed to safeguard a vital national
interest."38 The Court also noted that the statute was "restricted to its
appropriate end" by its limited registration requirement, 39 but the end itself
was sufficiently compelling-preventing special interest groups from
drowning out the "voice of the people."40 This distinguished the statute in
Harrissfrom those in Lovell and Schneider, which the Court thought overbroad
and insufficiently related to the purpose for which they were passed.
The Court's principal pre-Mclntyre statement about anonymous speech was
in Talley v. California.This 1960 case addressed a Los Angeles ordinance which
prevented the distribution of handbills unless the name and address of the

32308 U.S. 147 (1939) [hereinafter Schneider].
33

1d. at 162.

34

Id. The Court noted that "[t]here are obvious methods of preventing littering.
Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets."
Id.
35
Schneider at 160-64 The Court stated:
Although a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of
the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, these may not
abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitution to
those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or
opinion.
Id. at 160.
36347 U.S. 612 (1954).
37
38
39

40

1d. at 626.
Id.
1d.

d. at 625.
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author or distributor was printed thereon. 41 Los Angeles argued that the statute
was intended to identify the authors of, and thereby prevent, fraud, false
advertising, and libel.42
The Talley Court discussed the importance of anonymity in encouraging the
free flow of ideas and speech. 43 The Court listed several anonymous and
pseudonymous publications which had contributed to American politics, 44
and noted that "[ilt is plain that anonymity has sometimes been used for the
most constructive purposes.' '45 The Court then overturned the statute, holding
that "[tihere are times and circumstances when States may not compel groups
engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified ...
[I]dentification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions
of public matters of importance. This broad Los Angeles ordinance is... void
on its face."46 The Court had carved out a free-speech interest in anonymity for
the first time.
The anonymity issue was revisited in Buckley v. Valeo,47 a 1976 case which
challenged the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971.48 The challenge to the Act which involved anonymity was its requirement

41The statute challenged, § 28.06 of the Municipal Code of Los Angeles, read:
No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any
circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or the
face thereof, the name and address of the following:
(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same.
(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that in the case of a fictitious person or dub, in addition to such
fictitious name, the true names and addresses of the owners, managers
or agents of the person sponsoring said hand-bill shall also appear
thereon.
Talley, 362 U.S. at 60-61. Additionally, the Code, in § 28.00, defined hand-bill as:
'HAND-BILL' shall mean any hand-bill, dodger, commercial advertising circular, folder, booklet, letter, card, pamphlet, sheet, poster,
sticker, banner, notice or other written, printed or painted matter
calculated to attract attention of the public.
Id. at 63, footnote 4.
42

1d. at 64.

43

1d. The Court noted:
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have
played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been
able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously
or not at all.

44

Talley at 65 (listing the letters of Junius and the Federalist Papers).

45

1d. at 64-66.
1d. at 65.

Id.

46

47424 U.S. 1 (1976) [hereinafter Buckley].
4886 Stat. 3, as amended by 88 Stat. 1263.
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that candidates disclose the identity of any contributor who gave more than
$100 to their campaign. The Buckley Court examined the Act under strict
scrutiny, which it found necessary because "compelled disclosure has the
49
potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights.'
The Court discussed the forced disclosure issue as a serious infringement on
free speech:
We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the
associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to
supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are
less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable
to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter
contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The
public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a
consequent reduction in the5 free circulation of ideas both within and
0
without the political arena.
However, the Buckley Court found the Act justified by compelling
governmental interests. The Court divided the governmental interests into
three types: providing information to the electorate about a candidate's
funding; deterrence of corruption and the appearance thereof; and the
necessity of disclosure as a means of investigating and prosecuting violations
of contribution laws. Finding that these interests were sufficiently compelling
to justify the disclosures mandated by the Act, and sufficiently narrowly
51
tailored to meet them, the Court upheld the Act's disclosure provisions.
The Court admitted, in rejecting a suggested "minor-party exemption," that
"[tihere could well be a case . . . where the threat to the exercise of First
Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure
so insubstantial that the Act's requirements cannot be constitutionally
52
applied."
These cases failed to present a coherent picture of the status of anonymity
under the First Amendment. Lovell and Talley made it clear that forcing
disclosure of the identity of the speaker was an infringement on free speech,
and Lewis Publishing even held that such identification could not be forced
without an attendant unnecessary benefit, but both Buckley and Harrissseemed
to give greater weight to the government's interest in ensuring an election

49

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
50Id. at 71 (citations omitted).

5lId. at 84.
52
1d. at 71. That case came before the Court some five years later - Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) [hereinafter Brown]. The Socialist
Workers Party was able to prove a history of harassment and hostility, and the Court
upheld a District Court decision which exempted the Party from an Ohio disclosure law
similar to the Act's.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
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process free from corruption or fraud. 53 Although the Court's Lewis Publishing
and Talley decisions seemed to prevent governments from requiring
identification without some justification, the Court's reasoning in these cases
gave few clues as to what non-election-related interests would be sufficient to
support a disclosure requirement which was not attached to a
government-granted privilege. This unstable situation still existed almost
twenty years later when McIntyre reached the Court.
III. MCINTYRE v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMM'N

A. Background
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons
attending a public meeting at the Blendon Middle School in Westerville,
Ohio. 54 The leaflets, created on her home computer, conveyed her negative
stance on an upcoming school tax levy which was to be discussed at the
meeting.5 5 Some of the leaflets identified her as the author; others merely
purported to express the views of "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX
PAYERS.' '56
The levy was defeated twice, but finally passed in November 1988.57 In April
1989, an official of the school district filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections
Commission charging Mrs. McIntyre with violating section 3599.09(A) of the
Ohio Revised Code, which requires "the person who issues, makes, or is
responsible [for]" any publication "which is designed ... to influence the voters
53

This proved to be the source of Justice Scalia's dissent in McIntyre itself. See infra

text accompanying notes 82-86.
54 Mclntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
55

1d. at 1514 n.2. The leaflet read:
VOTE NO
ISSUE 19 SCHOOL TAX LEVY
Last election Westerville Schools, asked us to vote yes for new buildings and
expansions programs. We gave these what they asked. We knew there was
crowded conditions and new growth in the district.
Now we find out there is a 4 million dollar deficit - WHY?
We are told the 3 middle schools must be split because of overcrowding, and
yet we are told that 3 schools are being closed - WHY?
A magnet school is not a full operating school, but a specials school.
Residents were asked to work on a 20 member commission to help formulate
the new boundaries. For 4 weeks they worked long and hard and came up with
a very workable plan. Their plan was totally disregarded - WHY?
WASTE of tax payers dollars must be stopped. Our children's education and

welfare must come first. WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE TOLERATED.
PLEASE VOTE NO
ISSUE 19
THANK YOU.
561d. at 1514.
57

1d.
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in any election" to print their name and address "in a conspicuous place"
thereon.
The Commission found Mrs. McIntyre in violation of the statute and fined
her $100.58 The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas reversed the
commission's decision, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to Mrs.
McIntyre, since she had not "misled the public" or "acted in a surreptitious
manner."59 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed again, with a majority of the
court upholding the statute on stare decisis grounds because of a 1922 challenge
to the statute's predecessor. 60 Even though the Ohio Supreme Court had
decided the previous challenge only on the basis of the Ohio Constitution's
Free Speech Clause and had not considered the Federal Constitution, the
Appeals Court refused to overturn it.61
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Appeals Court, reconsidering the 1922
case, and finding that the "minor requirement" of identification "neither
impacts the content of [a speaker's] message nor significantly burdens their
ability to have it disseminated."62 The court continued:
This burden is more than counterbalanced by the state interest in
providing the voters to whom the message is directed with a
mechanism by which they may better evaluate its validity. Moreover,
the law serves to identify those who engage in fraud, libel or false
advertising. Not only are such interests sufficient to overcome the
minor burden placed upon such persons, these interests were
specifically acknowledged in [First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
be regulations of the sort which survive
435 U.S. 765 (1978)] to
63
constitutional scrutiny.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In a majority opinion authored by Justice
Stevens, the Court determined that such laws should be subjected to strict
scrutiny, and that Ohio's law failed to survive due to its overbreadth.
B. The Opinion
The Court's opinion stressed the value of anonymous speech and publishing
in historical America, detailing many authors, both literary and political, who
chose to exercise their "freedom to publish anonymously.' 64 The Court noted
the multiplicity of reasons for an author's choice not to reveal his or her name:
58 Mclntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1514.
59
60

1d. at 1515.
1d. The previous challenge was State v. Babst, 104 Ohio St. 167 (1922).

61Id. See Babst, supra note 60, 104 Ohio St. at 168.
62

Mclntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1515 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 67 Ohio

St. 3d 391 at 396 (1993)).
63

ld.

64

1d. at 1516.
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fear of governmental, personal, or reputational retribution, fear of social
ostracism, desire for privacy, or using anonymity as a rhetorical tactic. 65 The
Court also acknowledged the political tradition of anonymity, the secret ballot,
calling it a "respected tradition of anonymity" and worthy of protection.6 6 The
Court was clear in its recognition that anonymous speech has often been
socially useful.
The Court rejected an intermediate standard of scrutiny, which the Ohio
Supreme Court had applied pursuant to the analytical method stated in
Anderson v. Celebrezze.67 The Court applied a standard of strict scrutiny,68
stating that "[o]ur precedents.., make abundantly clear that the Ohio Supreme
Court applied a significantly more lenient standard than is appropriate in a
case of this kind."69 Even election-related speech is speech, said the Court, and
laws regulating it must be scrutinized strictly.
Ohio asserted that two governmental interests justified its law: providing
the electorate with relevant information, and preventing fraudulent and
libelous statements. 70 In summarily rejecting the "informed electorate" interest,

65

d. at 1516-17. On the use of anonymity as a rhetorical tactic, the Court noted:

Anonymity... provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply
because they do not like its proponent. Thus, even in the field of political
rhetoric, where 'the identity of the speaker is an important component
of many attempts to persuade,' the most effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymity.
Id. at 1517 (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 at 2046 (1994)).
66

Mclntyre at 1517.

67460 U.S. 780 (1983).
68

Mclntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518. The Court stated:
[Tihe category of speech regulated by the Ohio statute occupies the
core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment: "Discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.' Although First Amendment protections are not
confined to 'the exposition of ideas,' 'there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs, ... of course including discussions of
candidates.. .. ' This no more than reflects our 'profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' In a republic where the people are
sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation."
Id. at 1518-19 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 at 14-15 (1976)) (citations omitted).
69

d. at 1519.

70Id.
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the Court noted that "the identity of the speaker is no different from other
components of the document's content that the author is free to include or
71
exclude."
The Court gave serious thought, however, to the state's interest in preventing
fraud and libel. 72 The Court, however, found that Ohio not only had other
statutes geared toward their prevention, 73 but also had failed to use the law in
question, either as contemplated or as applied, to actually prevent fraud or
libel. 74 Since Ohio was not employing its law to fight fraud or libel, that
rationale was not justified. 75 Therefore, under McIntyre, a governmental

71 Additionally, the Court stated that:
The interest in providing voters with additional relevant information
does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or
disclosures she would otherwise omit. Moreover, in the case of a
handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and address of the author adds little, if anything,
to the reader's ability to evaluate the document's message.
McIntyre at 1519. The Court quoted, in a footnote, from a New York case invalidating a
law similar to Ohio's:
Of course, the identity of the source is helpful in evaluating ideas.
But 'the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.' Don't underestimate the
common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source
of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. They know
it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its
message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that
message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide
what is 'responsible', what is valuable, and what is truth.
Id. at 1519 n.11 (quotingNew York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, at 996 (1974)).
72

1d. at 1520 ("We agree with Ohio's submission that this interest carries special
weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious
adverse consequences for the public at large.").
73

1d. at 1520-21 ("[Ohio]'s Election Code includes detailed and specific prohibitions
against making or disseminating false statements during political campaigns. These
regulations apply both to candidate elections and to issue-driven ballot measures. Thus,
Ohio's prohibition of anonymous leaflets plainly is not its principal weapon against
fraud.") (citations omitted).
74

McIntyre at 1522. The Court stated:
[Ohio's law] applies no matter what the character or strength of
the author's interest in anonymity. Moreover, as this case...
demonstrates, the absence of the author's name on a document does
not necessarily protect either that person or a distributor of a forbidden
document from being held responsible for compliance with the election
code. Nor has the State explained why it can more easily enforce the
direct bans on [fraud] against anonymous authors and distributors
than against wrongdoers who might use false names and addresses in
an attempt to avoid detection.

75

The Court also distinguished the requirements upheld in Buckley:
Though [identification to the Federal Election Commission of the
amount and use of money expended in support of a candidate]

Id.
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identification requirement must directly address the problem which it is
designed to combat, and cannot simply serve as an aid to other statutes more
directly designed to punish wrongdoing.
While conceding that a more narrowly tailored statute might well survive
strict scrutiny based on the legitimate interest of the State in preventing fraud
relating to elections, 7 6 the Court found the Ohio law fatally overbroad. 77 The
Court ended its majority opinion with the broad statement quoted at the
opening of this article, 78 showing its commitment to protecting anonymous
speech as an integral part of the free speech tradition.
Justice Thomas filed a lengthy separate concurrence, agreeing with the
majority's result, but not its reasoning. 79 Thomas, looking to the original
intentions of the Framers, found several strong signs that they embraced
anonymous pamphleteering within their conception of freedom of the press.
He took note of precedents such as the 1735 trial of Peter Zenger and a transcript
of the 1779 Continental Congress, as well as a record of New Jersey Governor
William Livingston's defense of anonymous publishing in 1784.80 He also

undeniably impedes protected First Amendment activity, the
intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identification on all
election-related writings.... [E]ven though money may "talk," its
speech is less specific, less personal, and less provocative than a
handbill and as a result, when money supports an unpopular
viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate retaliation.
McIntyre at 1523.
76
Id. at 1522 ("We recognize that a State's enforcement interest might justify a more
limited identification requirement .. "); Id. at 1524 ("[A]lthough Buckley may permit
a more narrowly drawn statute, it surely is not authority for upholding Ohio's
open-ended provision."). In her concurrence, Justice Ginsberg also stated: "We do not
... hold that the State may not, in other, larger circumstances, require the speaker to
disclose its interest by disclosing its identity.... [T]he Court recognizes that a State's
interest in protecting an election process 'might justify a more limited identification
requirement'...." Id.
77

McIntyre at 1524. In particular, the Court stated that:
Ohio has not shown that its interest in preventing the misuse of
anonymous election-related speech justifies a prohibition of all uses
of that speech. The State may, and does, punish fraud directly. But
it cannot seek to punish fraud indirectly by indiscriminately outlawing
a category of speech, based on its content, with no necessary relationship to the danger sought to be prevented.

78

See text accompanying note 1, supra.

Id.
79

McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1530 ("I cannot join the majority's analysis because it deviates
from our settled approach to interpreting the Constitution and because it superimposes
its modem theories concerning expression upon the constitutional text.") (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
80

1d. at 1525-27. See also Justice Scalia's dissent, stating that "[tihe practice of
anonymous electioneering may have been less general in 1868, when the Fourteenth
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recounted debates surrounding the Federalists' early attempt to require
anonymous authors published in newspapers to leave their name with the
newspaper publisher as representative of the Framers' ideas on anonymity
81
protection.
A dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, took issue with Thomas' recounting and interpretation of the
historical record,82 arguing that there is insufficient evidence that anonymity
was regarded as a constitutional right by the Framers and their
contemporaries. 83 Making the point that general use of anonymous speech
84
does not necessarily prove its status as a constitutional right, Scalia
distinguished Ohio's law in McIntyre as a reasonable regulation of the electoral
process.85
Scalia presented McIntyre as a decision between the right to free speech and
the government's protection of the electoral process. He found precedent for
the proposition that protection of the electoral process is sufficiently important
justification for the infringement of the right to free speech, such as in Buckley
and Harriss,and noted that a right to anonymous speech has never before been
86
declared by the Court.
C. Interpretation
The Court's decision leaves many questions unanswered. Much import was
given to the political, individual nature of Mrs. McIntyre's speech. The question
remains how the Court would decide a future case where the anonymous
speech at issue was not political, or where it was expressed by an organizational
or corporate actor.

Amendment was adopted, but at least as late as 1837 it was respectable enough to be
engaged in by Abraham Lincoln." Id. at 1531.
81A massive groundswell of public opinion, under the prodding of the
Anti-Federalists, quashed the Federalists' attempt within a few short days. Id. at 1527-29.
82

Mclntyre at 1532, noting that "The concurrence recounts ... examples of defense of
anonymity in the name of'freedom of the press,' but not a single one involves the context
of restrictions imposed in connection with a free, democratic election .... Id.
83
1d. at 1531.
84Id. at 1531.
85

1d. at 1534. Justice Scalia argued: "[R]elevant to our decision is whether a 'right to

anonymity' is such a prominent value in our constitutional system that even protection
of the electoral process cannot be purchased at its expense." McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1534.
86
1d. at 1535. Justice Scalia noted that "[t]he existence of a generalized right of
anonymity in speech was rejected by this Court in [Lewis Publishing] .... Id.
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1. Allowing the 'Value' of Speech to Determine its Protection
American free-speech jurisprudence has long recognized that speech is
protected according to the valuation of its content by the government. 87
Following Alexander Meiklejohn's recognition of the activist, Madisonian
motivations behind the passage of the First Amendment, courts have gone to
greater lengths to protect political speech than any other kind. 88 The Court has
also expanded its protection of commercial speech in recent years, finding it
worthy of First Amendment protection. 89
Categories of speech which are not protected based on their content include
"fighting words,"90 defamatory speech, 9 1 and obscenity.92 These categories
have been the subject of heated argument, 93 especially in the Networld. 94 It is
doubtful that this valuation scheme will change in the near future. The Court
has amassed a huge body of precedent which rests on the tiered foundation,
and has no reason to dismiss it. However, the Court's pre-existing judgments
about the valuation of the content of speech are irrelevant to the protection of
anonymity in general since McIntyre requires that any regulation on anonymity
not be content-based.

87

See, generally, CASS R. SuNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM of FREE SPEECH
(1993).
88
See, generally, Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J.
1757, 1759-65 (1995) (contrasting modem "marketplace" theory of free speech with
"Madisonian" theory which takes an activist stance toward promoting political
discourse).
89

See Daniel Farber, Commercial Speech and FirstAmendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV.
372 (1979); Donald Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an
Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1987).
90

See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,

315 U.S. 568 (1942); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-18 (2d
1988); KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDs 99-123 (1995).
91

See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Marc Franklin, Constitutional
Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1657 (1987).
92

See Miller; TRIBE, supra note 90, § 12-16, 12-17 (1988).

93

See, e.g., in the "obscenity" area alone, Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"
Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretationof ConstitutionalLanguage, 67
GEO. L.J. 899 (1979); CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1994); NADINE STROSSEN,
DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY (1994).
94
The "obscenity" problem has been thoroughly commentated on, after the failure of
the modem Court's "community standards" test to protect a cyberspace which was
declared only "indecent" by its own geographical community from prosecution under
the community standards of another geographical city entirely. See Byassee, Jurisdiction
of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 197 at 203-16; Branscomb, supra note 3, at 1652-54; Eckenwiler, supra note 2;
Johnson, supra note 12.
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2. Speech by Corporate Actors

The Court has also historically given more protection to individuals' speech
than that of corporate or organizational speakers. 95 This historical pattern has
been recognized by at least one commentator as an outmoded heritage from a
less technological age, 9 6 but it exists nonetheless. Traditional paradigms of
speech, however, fail to address new and different technologies. The
individual-empowering nature of the Networld itself blurs the distinction
between individual and corporate speech. In most cyberspaces, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to tell whether a conglomerate or individual is speaking, or
whether their speech has been subsidized by a conglomerate. This difficulty
will increase as the Networld becomes more and more commercialized and
power is redistributed between authors and advertisers.
Even without intentional anonymity, authorship is also difficult to
determine in many cyberspaces. With hyperlink technology, 97 where a reader
is quickly and easily routed to multiple sources of information, housed at
geographically diverse computers, it quickly becomes difficult to distinguish
98
the "author" of any particular material.
It is likely that the Court will be forced to redefine its definitions of
commercial speech and specific authorship in the Networld. The distributed
nature of digital information is also problematic here, since difficulty in
locating a piece of information geographically may contribute to difficulty in
establishing authorship.
3. Conclusion
McIntyre represents a strong statement in favor of anonymous speech as
constitutionally protected speech. McIntyre requires courts to subject
anonymous-speech regulation to the same strict scrutiny they currently apply
to any other speech-related right. Government regulation which requires
disclosure of identity as a precondition of speech will only be upheld if it is
closely related to the enforcement of a compelling government interest.
McIntyre does not require the Court to alter the valuation scheme it uses to
determine the level of protection which is accorded to speech. However, in the
Networld, the distinction between corporate and personal speech is often
95

See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Ronald D. Rotunda, The

Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1080.
96
See Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm,104 YALE L.J. 1613 (1995).
97
Hyperlink technology refers to a method of information organization whereby
information may be (or, in some cases, must be) accessed through non-linear
relationships in order to facilitate interactivity. A hyperlink is drawnbetween two pieces
of information, and they are accessible from each other at the touch of a key or the click
of a mouse. See, GILSTER, supra note 13, at 560; BENNETT FALK, THE INTERNET ROADMAP,
at 55 (1994).
98

For example, should author A, who places a hyperlink to author B's site be made
somehow responsible for the contents of B's site?
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blurred and sometimes completely nonexistent. Decisions which seek to
protect personal speech differently from corporate speech will be difficult to
apply in the Networld.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF MCINTYRE
McIntyre refines the Court's stance on anonymous speech, finding it socially
valuable and worthy of constitutional protection. Despite the individual and
political nature of Mrs. McIntyre's speech, McIntyre is a strong statement in
favor of protecting all anonymous speech. This section of the Note will explore
potential methods of governmental regulation of anonymity in the Networld
and McIntyre's impact on them.
Two types of anonymity regulation are readily foreseeable for the purposes
of this Note. The government, at whatever level, from federal to municipal,
could require identification as a precondition for speech in the Networld, or it
could require identification as a precondition for access to the Networld.
A. Requiring Identification as a Preconditionof Speech
Requiring identification as a precondition of speech, such as outlawing the
transmission of anonymous messages from a particular access provider, from
a particular class of access providers, in a particular network, in a particular
cyberspace, in a particular class of cyberspaces, or throughout the Networld,
seems to violate McIntyre entirely. The McIntyre decision itself stands for the
proposition that the government cannot require identification as a
precondition to entering the marketplace of ideas, even when risks of fraud
and corruption of the electoral process are present. An identification
requirement such as this is a direct regulation of 'pure' speech and is clearly
unconstitutional under Talley andMcIntyre. Situations may exist in which such
a regulation might withstand strict judicial scrutiny, but such situations would
necessarily implicate other overriding constitutional rights, such as voting
rights or property rights.9 9
Additionally, such regulation would be impractical. The United States, as
stated above, only has jurisdiction over a small segment of the Networld. Those
who wished to anonymize their speech could simply use a foreign computer
to remove their identities, and preventing such messages from being sent or
reaching their destinations would be extremely difficult technologically.
B. Requiring Identificationas a Preconditionfor Access
The effect of McIntyre on governmental requirements of identification as a
precondition for access to the Networld is less clear, given that access is not a

99
See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding a ban on speech only
because voting rights required protection and ban narrowly tailored in time and place);
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (upholding ban on handbill
distribution only because reasonable regulation of conduct in a non-public forum).
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right protected from government regulation. 100 This precondition splits into a
further three categories: identification requirements as a precondition for
access to government-subsidized or government-operated access providers;
such requirements as a precondition for access through private providers; and
the validity of indirect disclosure requirements, such as those which require a
private access provider to disclose the identity of its subscribers once improper
conduct or speech has been identified. Each of these methods for anonymity
regulation has its advantages and risks.
1. Identification as a Precondition of Access Througha
Government-Sponsored Access Provider
Prior to McIntyre, it would seem supportable that governments could
reasonably require identification in order to provide direct access to the
Networld through government-operated access providers. Such access is not
a right,101 and a governmental demand for identification would seem to be a
reasonable requirement under Lewis Publishing.10 2 Other common entitlements
and public services, such as voting rights and library borrowing privileges,
require such identification and have not been constitutionally challenged.
However, McIntyre throws this into doubt. As Justice Scalia pointed out in
his dissent, 103 the Court's protection of anonymous speech is not clearly
delineated by McIntyre itself. It seems that governmental agencies which

100 Access to the Networld has been likened to access to the public road system more
than once. This argument finds one statement in the words of Professor Arthur R. Miller:
Society, for example, requires that automobiles have license plates to
travel on a public road. This modest deprivation of anonymity is
designed to promote accountability. Those who insist on anonymity
in placing telephone calls are, in essence, saying they do not want to
be accountable on the communications network, which is quite
analogous to driving without a license plate.
Hearingon S. 2030 Before the Subcomm. On Technology and the Law of the Senate Comm. On
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1990) (statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller);
also quoted in Branscomb, supra note 3, at 1643, n.10 (Branscomb notes that "Real
highways, however, do not carry the same First Amendment vulnerabilities that
electronic superhighways do." Id.).
101At least, access is not yet a right. Current political reality and the prohibitive cost
of such an entitlement makes it unlikely that this entitlement will be granted in the near
future. In any case, such developments are beyond the scope of this Note.
10 2
An analogy to Lewis Publishing is necessarily incomplete, however, since an
anonymous speaker who wished access to the mail system still had the option of
fourth-class postage in Lewis Publishing,while a speaker wishing access to the Networld
has no other government-sponsored alternative if an identification requirement is
imposed. It is possible that a limited service may be granted to anonymous users (for
instance, terminals in public libraries which can access information, but may not post
messages or otherwise publish information).
103 Mclntyre at 1535. Justice Scalia asked: "Must a government periodical that has a
'letters to the editor' column disavow the policy that most newspapers have against the
publication of anonymous letters?" Id.
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provide a forum for speech may not discriminate against anonymous speakers,
and this would extend to Networld access. Public libraries or city-sponsored
"Freenets"10 4 would be required to grant access to anonymous users under the
1° 5
This consequence of McIntyre does not seem to
same terms as named users.
106
and it will be left for others,
be fully understood even by the Court,
presumably the lower courts, to determine the rights granted to speakers under
McIntyre.
Additionally, it is clear that denying access to users based on probable
content of their speech would violate First Amendment principles, as would
107
discontinuing current users for the content of their speech. Such denials may
also violate equal protection principles if the denials show an intent to exclude
10 8
This content-based limitation would seem to
a particular class of persons.
grant users who obtain access through a government-sponsored access
provider the right to "anonymize" their speech through the use of various
technologies, as an extension of their right to determine the content of their
speech.
How is such user "anonymizing" accomplished? The most common and
easily accessible form of identity concealment in cyberspace is the use of
anonymous remailing. 109 This technology, which "anonymizes" electronic
mail, uses an independent 'middleman' computer to strip away the sender's
identity and return address before forwarding the message to its intended
address. 110 Some remailer computers keep track of the sender's address so that
replies can be forwarded in the opposite direction, and some remailers
purposely delete all sender-related information so that the identity of the
111
sender is impossible to trace once the message has been forwarded.

104 Many large cities sponsor or allow public access through such Freenet programs,
which provide free or low-cost access to city residents. See, GILSTER, supra note 13, at 559.
105
The limited access suggested in note 102, supra, would be insufficient under
McIntyre because it would impermissibly curtail access of anonymous speakers as
compared with identified speakers.
106
It is possible that the Court will interpret McIntyre narrowly in future decisions,
allowing other anonymity regulations to withstand strict scrutiny. This would be
required if the holding of McIntyre were misconstrued by the lower courts. However,
this questions remains for a future Note.
107Content-based regulation of speech was found unconstitutional in, e.g., R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid.").
108
See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14.4 (5th ed.
1995); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
109

See Andre Bacard, Frequently Asked Questions About Anonymous Remailers (last

modified November 15, 1996), <http: / /www.well.com/user/abacard/remail.htm>.
1l01d.
A list of currently available remailers is Raph Levien, Remailer List (visited January
21,1997), <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-raph/remailer-list.html>.
111
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With such technology, the sender's access provider does not usually provide,
or even know about, its subscribers' use of anonymizing technology; it is
external and separate from the sender's access to the Networld.
Would a governmental access provider be engaging in content-based speech
discrimination if it refused to send such messages? This is a difficult issue to
predict, due to the relative scarcity of government-subsidized access providers
and the fact that the use of data encryption, anonymization, or data
compression as an aspect of speech has not yet made its way into the law
112
reviews, much less the courts.
Clearly, though, a governmental access provider which engages in any
currently identifiable form of content-based discrimination would be violating
the First Amendment, and a governmental access provider may not, under
McIntyre, require identification as a precondition for use of government
facilities to gain access to the Networld.
2. Requirement of Identification as a Precondition to Access Through a
Private Access Provider
On a related topic, could the government require identification or licensing
as a precondition to access through a private access provider? This approach
would not only leave open the possibility of online "anonymizing",11 3 but it
would also allow governmental regulation of access to the 'marketplace of
ideas' in a particular medium. This was the very reason that the Court struck
down the city ordinance in Griffin.11 4 Additionally, such a system would
require equal protection scrutiny, to ensure non-discriminatory conduct by the
government in granting licenses.
Given the free-speech rights implicated by government regulation of
identity and the McIntyre decision itself, government regulations requiring
identification in connection with speech are to be subjected to strict scrutiny.
The question remains what, if any, state interests would support such a
regulation. The interests argued in McIntyre, such as prevention of fraud and
libel or increasing information to the recipient or recipients, were rejected as
insufficient by the Court. However, if identification requirements are the only
way to enforce such a state interest in the Networld, the Court might find such
requirements sufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand strict scrutiny.
Luckily for libertarians, it is unlikely that identification requirements will be
necessary to enforce law in the Networld. Just as in McIntyre, other methods
exist to punish wrongdoers. Civil remedies are available, 115 as well as a range

112This issue is one which begs for scholarly writing, but is beyond the scope of this
Note.
113
See supra text accompanying notes 109-111.
114

See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
See, e.g., Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l, 245 Va. 202, 427 S.E.2d 326
(1993) [hereinafter Krantz] (allowing action against pilots' union for tortious interference
115
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of criminal statutes.11 6 These tools serve many of the same functions as Ohio's
anti-fraud election laws, and are more narrowly tailored to combat the harms
at issue. 117

It may be that a Government could analogize an identification requirement
in the Networld to an automobile licensing requirement,11 8 but such an analogy
would not hold, as automobiles are not instruments of "pure" speech and are
subject to much greater regulation generally. 119 It is unlikely that this rationale
would be compelling enough to require any person who wished to speak in
120
the Networld to register their identity before gaining access at all.
3. Indirect Requirement of Identification as a Precondition to Access:
Recordkeeping and Warrant Requirements
It is already well-established in practice that an access provider is the master
of its subscribers. The default relationship between access provider and
subscriber is at will, with each party to the relationship, access provider and
subscriber, able to terminate the service for any or no reason. Additionally, most
of the current "self-regulation" of which Netizens 121 are so proud takes the form
of requests by users to an access provider that a particular subscriber be
122
removed or reprimanded.
Thus, it seems that access providers, not being state actors, have the freedom
to terminate or restrict their subscribers without implicating First Amendment
rights at all, since the subscriber may always gain access to the Networld

with contract after 'blacklist" was posted in union's Bulletin Board Service (BBS)
cyberspace).
116

See generally, Eckenwiler, supra note 2. (citing recent uses of, inter alia, federal
copyright-infringement law, federal law prohibiting interstate transmission of
obscenity, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986).
117

1t has been suggested that access providers "who choose to provide an anonymous
service should be held responsible for abusive messages posted on the system, since the
real abusers would not be identifiable except through the entrepreneur providing this
service." Branscomb, supra note 3, at 1661, n.96.
118

See note 100, supra.

119

See, e.g., O.R.C. § 4549.10 (providing for penalty for operating an automobile on a
public road without license plates). This law, if it implicated a genuine free-speech
interest, would be unconstitutional as a requirement of speech. See Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977) (overturning New Hampshire statute requiring all state license plates
to bear the legend "Live Free or Die").
12 0

As a practical matter, this approach would fail to regulate anonymity entirely, since
it leaves open the possibility of online "anonymizing" once access has been gained. See
supra text accompanying notes 109-111.
12 1
A "Netizen" is a created term to refer to citizens of the Networld. It usually refers
to users with experience and knowledge about the customs and etiquette of Networld
conduct and who share their knowledge with others.
12 2

See Long, supra note 7, at 1203, n.142 (detailing one newsgroup's response to
inappropriate or abusive postings).
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through another access provider. This method of control over subscriber
conduct seems favored by Netizens, as well as by libertarians. 123
Still, it is not clear to what extent anonymity rights are protected in this
context. If a subscriber has misbehaved fairly harmlessly, other users may not
even care about his or her true identity, as long as his or her offensive conduct
stops. An access provider which fails to adequately reprimand or control its
subscribers becomes the target of scorn or disfavor, but rarely is subject to any
tangible penalty.
More serious harms, though, such as libel, solicitation or execution of
criminal activity, obscenity, copyright infringement, or national security breach
may require more accountability by subscribers. Access providers may be
asked to divulge the identity of a subscriber through any of several legal
proceedings. 124 If an access provider wishes to protect the identity of its
subscriber, on what grounds may it avoid contempt liability if it refuses to
divulge its subscriber's identity?
Various legal theories exist to protect such sources, with the bulk resting on
two theories: freedom to associate and its attendant rights, or freedom of the
press and its attendant rights. The grounds for protecting subscribers' identities
from disclosure will be discussed in turn.
C. Freedom of Association
Freedom of association has been used to protect anonymity in several noted
U.S. Supreme Court cases. Perhaps the most famous is NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson,125 in which the Court held that forcing the NAACP to divulge its
membership lists was "likely to affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] to
pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the
right to advocate.' 126 The Court also exempted the Socialist Workers' Party
from disclosing its membership lists on similar grounds in Brown v. Socialist
127
Workers '74 Campaign Committee.
The freedom of association doctrine applies to the Networld because of its
nature in encouraging virtual association. There has been some theoretical
argument that every action in the Networld, from opening one's e-mail to

123

See Johnson, supra note 12, stating: "Moreover, the new 'netizens' would prefer to

regulate their own affairs and resent intrusions by regulators who do not fully
understand or share their enthusiasm for this new medium." Id. See also Branscomb,
supranote 3, at 1665-70.
124

Such proceedings include civil discovery and criminal grand juries on both the

federal and state levels, as well as search warrants. One commentator has urged that
warrants requiring an access provider to divulge the identity of a subscriber be issued
according to the already-existing standards of the federal Title III wiretap act, 18 U.S.C.
2510 et seq. See Long, supra note 7, at 1205-07.
125357 U.S. 449 (1958) [hereinafter NAACP].
1261d. at 462-63.
127

See note 52, supra.
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entering a chatroom or newsgroup, creates some form of cyberspace, and that
such spaces are forums jointly created by their members for purposes of
association. 12 8 A private chatroom where particular persons meet or a
newsgroup in which particular topics are discussed is a metaphysical 'space'
created just for that purpose.129 Surely, if the government licenses access to that
'space', it is restricting freedom of association. 130
This theory is perhaps the most logical one for examining the status of
assembly rights, since it allows modem courts to use an existing body of
precedent in a new technological situation. 131 This resolves, at least in this area,
one of the major stumbling blocks in evolving a Networld jurisprudence, since
"new relationships strain legal principles and categories that currently direct
judicial power over individual action, either civilly or criminally."132
A requirement by the government that persons register their identities before
entering the Networld is clearly one which abridges the right to peaceable
assembly. Like the statutes at issue in Thomas v. Collins133 and NAACP v.
Alabama, a statute requiring registration would make potential subscribers less
likely to join a particular access provider, based on the chance of eventual
disclosure of their membership.
This infringement on freedom of association has only been used to overturn
registration laws, however, when a history of harassment and social hostility
is proven. 134 Without such a showing, therefore, an access provider may be

12 8 See Johnson, supra note 12.
129 See M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First
Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681 (1995) (discussing the new challenges to legal doctrine
presented by the shift from a linear, textual communication technology to a nonlinear,
interactive, self-created communication technology).
130
This theory poses some interesting equal-protection problems. Unlike public
schools, for instance, conversational cyberspaces are interchangeable and infinitely
replicable. State actors who provide exclusive cyberspaces for gender or ethnic groups
who wish a forum to discuss issues particular to their group may be violating
equal-protection principles by attempting to apply the "separate-but-equal' doctrine.
See Branscomb, supra note 3, at 1654-55 (discussing male-only cyberspace provided to
students at the Santa Rosa Junior College as a counterpart to previously-established
female-only cyberspace); David J. Goldstone, The Public Fonm Doctrine in the Age of the
Information Superhighway,46 HASTINGs L.J. 335 (1995).
131This has been successfully accomplished in some areas of law without significant
difficulty. See, e.g., Krantz.
132 Byassee, supra note 94, at 199.
133323 U.S. 516 (1945) (striking down state law requiring registration of labor
organizers on the grounds that it unduly restricted freedom of association).
13 4 See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. The Court stated that "Petitioner has made an
uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its
rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility."
Id.; Brown, 459 U.S. at 98-99, stating 'The District Court found 'substantial evidence of
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subject to both criminal contempt (if the government seeks the subscriber's
identity in a grand jury proceeding) and civil contempt (if the identity is sought
in connection with a civil suit) for refusing to disclose their subscriber's
identity.
Also, the right to peaceable association does not protect access providers
from direct liability if they participate in criminal or tortious activity or know
of its presence in their cyberspace and allow it to continue. Under existing law,
to liability
a system operator who tacitly allows such activity may be subject
135
herself, either as an aider and abettor, or as a co-participant.
D. Freedom of the Press
Freedom of the press has been used to protect speech more strongly than
that of association. For instance, the Court's famous case of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan 136 required public figures who were allegedly libelled to prove that
the libelous statement was made with "actual malice." 137 This allowed speech
which was false and harmful to enjoy protection under the First Amendment.
Additionally, anonymity protection has been given to journalistic sources in
order to protect the freedom of the press. 138 In a line of cases beginning with
Branzburg v. Hayes,139 the Court recognized that requiring journalists to reveal
their sources in all situations would act "to the detriment of the free flow of
information protected by the First Amendment."140
However, the Court's protection of journalistic sources only applies where
141
This indicates
"legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.
that journalists (or access providers) will not be able to protect the anonymity
of their sources in cases of "actual malice" libel or criminal activity, as these do
not further "legitimate First Amendment interests."
Therefore, an access provider who attempts to maintain a subscriber's
anonymity interest in a criminal proceeding or civil suit must show that their
subscriber's speech is protected by a First Amendment interest, or face
contempt penalties.

both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and
supporters."' Id.
135

See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794,
1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (Nassau Cty. May 26, 1995) (allowing access provider to be
held jointly and severally liable for defamation as a "publisher" of their subscriber's
defamatory statements).
136376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13 7 1d. at 279-80.
138

See Long, supra note 7, at 1195-98.

139408 U.S. 665 (1972).
14 0

1d. at 680.

14 1

Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
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V. CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in McIntyre protects much anonymous speech and
reminds us that anonymous and pseudonymous speech is as much a part of
our free-speech heritage as any other kind and is, thus, deserving of
appropriate protections.
McIntyre requires that any government regulation which requires disclosure
of identity as a precondition to speech must be scrutinized strictly, and that
governmental interests in informing the electorate or preventing fraud or libel
will be insufficient to justify such a law. Even though the facts in McIntyre
demonstrated political speech by an individual, the Court's rationale
demonstrated its willingness to protect a broad range of anonymous speech in
the interest of maintaining a marketplace of ideas.
The effects of this decision on the Networld are multiple. Governmental
requirements of identity by private access providers are constitutionally
suspect, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny as an infringement of the First
Amendment. Identification requirements by governmental access providers
are invalid after McIntyre.
Licensing or registration requirements for access to the Networld through
private access providers are only valid if they are narrowly tailored to the end
which the government seeks to accomplish. Since other means are available for
combatting criminal and tortious conduct in the Networld, it is unlikely that
such requirements will withstand strict scrutiny.
Given a system where access providers are required to disclose the identity
of their subscribers in case-specific instances, such as search warrants or
subpoenas, access providers who wish to protect the anonymity of their users
will have to show either that subscribers whose identities are known have
suffered a history of past harassment and threats, under the
freedom-of-assembly model, or that the content of their users' speech furthers
a "legitimate First Amendment interest", under the model of the
journalist-source relationship.
McIntyre answers only a few of the questions currently undecided about
anonymity in the Networld, but its rationale, which favors anonymity over
disclosure requirements, is a strong precedent for cases yet to enter the courts.
GEORGE H. CARR
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